Jumpstarting AI Governance
We recorded 5 claims from this post. 2 were checked against evidence. 3 can’t be checked. 3 more are held. Read the post at its source.
Claims from this post (5)
In the order they appear in the post. Each quotation is the speaker’s words in this post. A label such as “Supported” or “Can’t be checked” is the claim’s current assessment; its page has the evidence and the reasons.
Assessment: MixedSaid
“In just a few short months, the race to regulate AI, possibly at an international level, has gone from barely on the table to heated.”
What we tested: Within a few months before July 2023, the push to regulate AI, possibly internationally, went from barely being discussed to heated.
What held: This primary government announcement describes summit planning, recent G7 discussions and meetings with frontier AI companies. It supports the high-level activity component by June, but does not establish a marginal starting point. (UK Prime Minister's Office, )
What did not: The February meeting was already the committee's fourth plenary, with negotiations and draft convention provisions under examination. That challenges the description of international AI regulation as barely on the table early in 2023. (Council of Europe, Committee on Artificial Intelligence, )
Assessment: Can’t be checkedSaid
“Many of us have also become worried about the possibility of regulatory capture, and whether shrewd executives at the major tech companies might induce governments to alight on regulation that ultimately does more harm than good, keeping out smaller players, and entrenching Big Tech’s own status, while doing little to address the underlying risks, such as around misinformation and cybercrime.”
What we tested: Major tech company executives might get governments to adopt AI regulation that does more harm than good by keeping out smaller players and entrenching Big Tech, while doing little about risks like misinformation and cybercrime.
Assessment: Can’t be checkedSaid
“Throughout the time in which I have been advocating for international AI governance, I have emphasized the need to have scientists and civil society more generally at the table.”
What we tested: International AI governance should include scientists and civil society at the table.
Assessment: UnresolvedSaid
“Second, there is speed; virtually everyone recognizes that large language models carry risks as well as opportunities, and that there is an urgent need to start to address these risks.”
What we tested: Virtually everyone recognizes that large language models carry risks as well as opportunities, and that there is an urgent need to start addressing these risks.
Assessment: Can’t be checkedSaid
“If we can produce the right package of tools and expertise for auditing, prerelease examination, and so on, address questions of bias, reliability, misinformation and so forth, working together of course with existing agencies that have been aiming to craft related standards, adoption may be swift.”
What we tested: If CATAI can produce the right package of tools and expertise for auditing, prerelease examination, and so on, and address questions of bias, reliability, misinformation and so forth, working with existing agencies that have been aiming to craft related standards, adoption may be swift.
Held from this post (3)
These records did not pass every check, so nothing about them is published. Held is not a finding.
- The two reviews reached different assessments. Our reading, not assessed: If many countries adopt common AI regulatory procedures and practices, big tech companies will be obliged to take them seriously.
- The record does not meet the current rules. Our reading, not assessed: Common international AI standards are in AI companies' own interest, both for interoperability and to avoid the emissions of training separate models for each country.
- The two reviews read the claim differently